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LAWS INTENTIONALLY FAVORING MAINSTREAM
RELIGIONS: AN UNHELPFUL COMPARISON
TO RACE
Gary J Simsont
In various articles spanning the past thirty years, Jesse Choper has
argued for a rather indulgent approach to laws adopted to favor one
or more religions.' According to Choper, intentional government
preferences for religion should survive Establishment Clause review as
long as they are not likely to "impair religious freedom," 2 by which he
means not likely to make people either (1) act contrary to their religion, (2) engage in a religious activity that, though not barred by their
religion, they would not otherwise have engaged in, or (3) contribute
3
financial support to religion.
Applying this approach, Choper has, for example, argued that
the Supreme Court erred in striking down a Kentucky statute that required public schools to post the Ten Commandments in all classrooms 4 and an Arkansas statute that prohibited public schools from
teaching evolution.5 He also has made clear that, as long as the costs
to the government are relatively minimal, he has no difficulty with the
6
government's putting up creches or other religious holiday displays.
t
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, Yale University. I am
grateful to Kathy Abrams, Rosalind Simson, and Mark Solomon for various helpful
comments.

This article is a slightly revised version of remarks delivered as a response to Professor
Choper's Stevens Lecture. As in my oral remarks, I will not attempt here to comment on
the full range of issues addressed by Professor Choper, but instead will focus on the major
theme that seems to me most problematic.
1 See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Church, State and the Supreme Court: Current Controversy, 29
Aiuz. L. REv. 551 (1987) [hereinafter Choper, Current Controversy];Jesse H. Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1980)
[hereinafter Choper, Reconcilingthe ConflictJ;JesseH. Choper, Religion in thePublic Schools: A
Proposed ConstitutionalStandard,47 MiNN. L. REV. 329 (1963).
2 See Choper, Reconciling the Conflic4 supra note 1, at 675.
3

Seeid.

4 See Choper, Current Controversy, supra note 1, at 554 (discussing Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980)).
5 See Choper, Reconciling the Conflict, supra note 1, at 687-88 (discussing Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
6 See Choper, Current Controversy, supra note 1, at 553-54. With regard to the Supreme
Court's approach to such issues, see Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (invalidating the display in a county courthouse of a crbche standing alone, while upholding
the display outside a local government building of a giant Hanukkah menorah alongside a
Christmas tree); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding the display of a creche
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In addressing the constitutionality under the Establishment Clause of
these different forms of government action, Choper has readily conceded that the purpose underlying each is solely religious7-a concession that, without more, would require their invalidation under the
Supreme Court's basic approach to Establishment Clause problems
since at least 1963.8 Choper has maintained, however, that these government actions do not overstep constitutional bounds because they
are not, in his judgment, likely to impair religious liberty.
In light of Choper's prior writings, it hardly comes as a surprise to
find him arguing in the lead article to this symposium for relatively
relaxed judicial review of laws deliberately advantaging mainstream religions. 9 The defense that Choper offers here for his position, however, is novel: a defense predicated on differences that he perceives
between laws intentionally favoring mainstream religions and ones intentionally favoring the racial majority. According to Choper, "there
are significant differences between race and religion when deliberate
advantageis at issue. These distinctions are sufficient to warrant contrasting constitutional treatment."' 0
I hope to demonstrate in this article the unpersuasiveness of this
defense. Before turning to the particulars of the defense, however, I
probably, in the interest of candor, should make clear the basic skepticism with which I approach it. Much as I admire Choper's willingness
to stand by a position that he deems correct in the face of substantial
Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, nothing that he has said to
date persuades me that his position merits adoption. In my view, he
as part of a city's annual Christmas display, which also consisted of, among other things, a
Santa Claus house, reindeer, and cut-out figures of a teddy bear and clown).
7 See supra notes 4-6.
8 In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the Court announced a two-part test for constitutionality under the Establishment Clause, and one part
was that "there must be a secular legislative purpose." The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), added a third requirement to the Schempp test without altering
the original two. Although the Court has not been entirely consistent in its explanations of
the secular purpose requirement, it seems clear that the Court will not strike down a law
for failure to meet this requirement unless the law is proven to rest exclusively or almost
exclusively on religious purposes. See GaryJ. Simson, The EstablishmentClause in the Supreme
Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. Rav. 905, 909 & n.24 (1987).
9 Choper devotes little attention in this article to laws deliberately advantaging minority religions because he regards it as largely noncontroversial that such laws should
receive relatively relaxed review. SeeJesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 504-05 (1994). I would apply the
same rigorous review to laws intentionally favoring minority religions as I would apply to
ones intentionally favoring mainstream religions. See Simson, supra note 8. I agree, however, that laws intentionally favoring minority religions tend to be less problematic than
ones intentionally favoring mainstream religions, because they more commonly take the
form of exemptions from generally applicable laws that, if applied to those exempted,
would impose a substantial burden on religious liberty.
10 Choper, supra note 9, at 501.
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assigns far too little importance to government sponsorship of religion-one of the principal evils that, according to the Supreme
Court" and many commentators, 12 the Establishment Clause was intended to provide protection against.' 3 I also believe that he fails to
appreciate the special threat posed by laws intentionally advantaging
religion as "step[s] that could lead" 14 to the ultimate evil of a governmentally established religion. Indeed, not only do I agree with the
Supreme Court that laws based solely on a purpose of favoring religion should, without more, be struck down; I also believe that any law
that would not have been adopted but for a religious purpose should
be struck down, whether or not that purpose was exclusive or even
15
primary.

H1 See Lemon,
12

403 U.S. at 612.
See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the

EstablishmentClause: The UntappedPotential ofJustice O'Connor'sInsigh 64 N.C. L. REv. 1049
(1986); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It: The Supreme Court and Establishmen4 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986); Simson, supra note 8; William Van Alstyne, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr.Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE
LJ. 770.
13 As indicated by Choper's discussion here of government financial support of religion, as well as by his characterization elsewhere of such support as an impairment of
religious freedom, he expressly assigns mich more significance to this commonly cited
Establishment Clause evil than he does to sponsorship. See Choper, supranote 9, at 512-13;
supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. His treatment of parochial school aid, however,
suggests that, as a practical matter, the difference in his express approaches to sponsorship
and financial support of religion generally may be of little consequence. See Jesse H.
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 260 (1968) (aid
to parochial schools should not be regarded as government financial support of religion as
long as the amount awarded does not exceed the value of the secular services provided by
the schools). See also Choper, Reconciling the Conflict; supra note 1, at 679-80 (acknowledging in 1980 that under his approach to parochial school aid "all of the many aid programs
to elementary and secondary parochial schools that the Court has invalidated since 1971
would have probably survived constitutional challenge"). For Establishment Clause analyses much less permissive of parochial school aid, see Paul A. Freund, PublicAid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARuv. L. REv. 1680 (1969); Simson, supra note 8.
14 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
15 See Simson, supra note 8, at 908-11. See also id. at 922-23 (suggesting that the effects
prong of the Lemon test is best understood as a means of weeding out laws that there is
good reason to suspect are based on a religious purpose). As discussed in id. at 913-15, I
believe that certain "religious" purposes do not provide a basis for invalidation under the
Establishment Clause because of their relationship to the requirements of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Moreover, I should note in this regard that I believe that the
Free Exercise Clause is properly interpreted to require rigorous review of substantial burdens on religious exercise that result from generally applicable laws. Though contrary to
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), this view is in keeping with the
Supreme Court's basic approach prior to Smith. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
257-58 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). It is also in keeping with the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which was enacted essentially to override
Smith. See Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4).
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Choper's argument in this symposium for rather relaxed review
of laws intentionally favoring mainstream religions essentially consists
of three steps:
1. Laws deliberately disadvantaging religious minorities are as
disrespectful of religious minorities as laws deliberately disadvantaging racial minorities are of racial minorities. Courts therefore
should treat both types of laws the same, reviewing them with the
suspicion and "strict scrutiny" that laws treating people with such
tangible disrespect so obviously demand.
2. Laws deliberately favoring the racial majority are as disrespectful of racial minorities as laws deliberately disadvantaging racial minorities and therefore deserve the same highly demanding
level ofjudicial review.
3. Laws deliberately favoring mainstream religions are plainly
not as disrespectful of religious minorities as laws deliberately favoring the racial majority are of racial minorities. Courts therefore
should take a considerably more indulgent approach to laws deliberately favoring mainstream religions than the strict scrutiny approach that laws favoring the racial majority are most sensibly
6
understood to require.'
I believe that this argument rests, implicitly or explicitly, on three
questionable assumptions that, taken together, deprive the argument
of any significant force.

16 As I have indicated, Choper compares laws favoring the racial majority with ones
favoring mainstream religions. In the lecture upon which his article is based, he explained
that he made the comparison to mainstream religions rather than to the majority religion
because in the United States "there is no majority religion." Text of Stevens Lecture at p.
5. One consequence of making the comparison as he does is that he implicitly and, I
think, anomalously treats Judaism-a religion shared by less than three percent of the
United States population, see AMmucAN JEwIsH COMMITrEE, AMERICAN JEWIsH YE.AR BOOK
1992, at 144 (1992)-as somehow on a par in terms of societal dominance or "in"-ness with
the racial majority. See Choper, supra note 9, at 501 n.76 (characterizing Judaism as a
mainstream religion).
In my view, drawing the comparison to "mainstream religions" needlessly confuses the
issue. First of all, it is not clear that there is no majority religion in the United States.
Although it is undoubtedly inappropriate for certain purposes to speak of Christianity as a
single religion, I question whether it is inappropriate to speak of Christianity in this way for
purposes of the present discussion. As exemplified perhaps most clearly by controversies
over cr~ches funded by the government or on government property, it is not uncommon
for laws favoring religion to endorse religious beliefs shared across the divisions of
Christianity.
Second and more basically, rather than draw the comparison to mainstream religions
or the majority religion, Choper most logically and easily could draw it to majoritarian
religious beliefs. Whether or not it is appropriate in this context to speak of Christianity as
the majority religion, there plainly are majoritarian religious beliefs in the United Statesones that run through various, if not all, divisions of Christianity as well as, at times, Judaism and other religions.
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Assumption A: The special concern under the Equal Protection Clause
with laws deliberately disadvantagingracialminorities is based on the degree of
disrespect communicated by such laws.
Though questionable, this assumption is substantially more defensible than the other two that I will examine. For that reason, and
because a full-scale examination of the validity of the assumption
would take me far afield for present purposes, I am content for now
simply to highlight that the assumption is open to reasonable debate.
The history of the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause indicates quite clearly that its framers viewed laws deliberately disadvantaging blacks with special concern. 17 Not nearly as clear,
however, is what feature or features of these laws gave rise to this special concern-a question of vital importance to determining the extent, if any, to which this special concern should (for purposes of
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause) be understood as extending
beyond racial classifications to classifications of other sorts. At least
implicitly, Choper's answer to this question is that the framers' special
concern with laws deliberately disadvantaging blacks was rooted in the
gross disrespect that such laws show to blacks.
Choper is not alone in offering this answer,' but various people
have suggested, expressly or implicitly, that the question should be
answered quite differently. Some have suggested, for example, that
the special concern with racial classifications reflected in substantial
part an objection to disadvantaging people on the basis of an unchangeable characteristic, 19 while others have taken the view that this
concern was prompted solely by the distinctive history of racial discrimination in the United States.2 0 As indicated elsewhere, 2' my own
view is that the special concern with racial classifications was grounded
in suspicion of the fairness and objectivity of the legislative process-a
process dominated by whites not only in terms of actual representation on legislatures but also in terms of capacity to influence lawmaking bodies. The Supreme Court has not spoken clearly with regard to
the source or sources of this special concern, seemingly suggesting

17

See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Strauder v. West Virginia,

100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).

18 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the SegregationDecisions, 69 YALE LJ.
421 (1960).
19 See, e.g., Samuel T. Perkins & ArthurJ. Silverstein, Note, The Legality of Homosexual
Marriage,82 YALE L.J. 573, 576 (1973).
20
See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649-50 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dis-

senting).
21

(1974).

Gary J. Simson, Note, Mental illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE LJ. 1237
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different answers at different times.2 2 In short, without canvassing further the range of answers offered, it should be apparent that Choper's
answer, though not patently ill-founded, is hardly noncontroversial.
Assumption B: Laws deliberately favoring mainstream religions are
plainly not as disrespectful of religious minorities as laws deliberatelyfavoring
the racial majority are of racialminorities.
In effect, the principal support that Choper offers for this assumption is his intuitive judgment, but he also appears to offer two
somewhat distinct arguments. First, the religious beliefs deliberately
favored by law tend to be so "appealing" or "wholesome" that
nonadherents of the favored religion often do not regard laws deliberately favoring religion as communicating to them any sort of message
of disrespect.2 3 Second, "our heritage" affirms that religion is such an
inherently good thing that it is illogical to think that intentional government favoring of religion could take on for nonadherents of the
favored religion anything approximating the type of ugly visage that
intentional government favoring of the racial majority no doubt takes
24
on for racial minorities.
As an initial matter, I at least would like to raise the question of
whether courts should be willing to act on the type of qualitative judgment made by Assumption B absent some empirical support for the
judgment made. Assuming, however, that that objection is not dispositive, I would argue that if, as Choper at least implicitly suggests, intuitive judgment is the key, his intuition is simply wrong. From my
perspective, the two sets of laws at issue generally seem about equally
effective at communicating disrespect. Indeed, given Choper's recognition at the start of his article that race and religious belief "have
been the object of public (and private) stereotyping, stigma, subordination, and persecution in strikingly similar ways," 25 I have some difficulty understanding why his intuition on this matter is as different
from mine as it is.
I think the explanation lies in the two arguments that I identify
above as offered in support of his judgment-arguments that I find
fundamentally and similarly flawed. For so many people, and I include myself in the group, religion is a source of many good thingsinsight, guidance, inspiration, comfort, and more. As a result of these
22

See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Plyler

v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 n.14 (1982); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92
(1964).
23 See Choper, supra note 9, at 502.
24 See id. It is not entirely clear whether in making these two arguments Choper is
discussing nonadherents' actual perceptions or, instead, the perceptions that nonadherents most reasonably would have. My rendition of the arguments assumes the former, but
my criticisms are essentially the same regardless.
25

Id. at 492.
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many positive associations, however, it is very easy and natural to underestimate the harmful effects that religion can have when the hand
of the state is placed behind it. Choper's two arguments for Assumption B seem to epitomize this mindset. He is so focused on the positive aspects of religion that he fails to take seriously how effective
government sponsorship of religion can be at inflicting a feeling of
second-class citizenship on people who adhere either to religions
other than the favored one or to no religion at all. However benevolent the government's motives may be, its putting its stamp of approval on a particular religion or religious belief communicates to
nonadherents a message of very basic disrespect-a message that they
are less than full members of the political community.2 6 I can not say
for certain that this message is every bit as disrespectful as the message
sent to racial minorities by laws intentionally favoring the racial majority. I am confident, however, that any difference is much less pronounced than Choper suggests.
Assumption C: The fact that laws deliberatelyfavoring mainstream religions are plainly not as disrespectful of religious minorities as laws deliberately
favoring the racialmajority are of racialminorities indicates that courts should
review laws of the former type with much less rigor than laws of the latter
variety.
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Assumptions A
and B are valid, Assumption C almost certainly is not. Its primary defect is that it fails to take account of the fact that the principal constitutional objection to laws deliberately favoring the racial majority is
based on the Equal Protection Clause while the principal constitutional objection to laws deliberately favoring mainstream religions is
based on the Establishment Clause. In interpreting different constitutional provisions, courts sensibly recognize that different provisions
reflect different concerns and tailor their approach to each provision
to the particular concerns that prompted its adoption. Even if one
assumes that the intensity of review under the Equal Protection Clause
should vary according to the degree of disrespect communicated by
the law under review, it does not follow that the intensity of review
under the Establishment Clause should vary according to how the law
under review compares in degree of disrespect communicated to laws
given the most intense equal protection review. It would only follow if
the Establishment Clause is as fully rooted as the Equal Protection
Clause in a concern for the disrespect communicated by laws, and by
all indications, it is not.
26

See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465

U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Simson, supra note 8, at 916; Van
Alstyne, supra note 12, at 782, 787.
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The language 27 and history28 of the Establishment Clause underline its framers' concern with laws that threaten to lead a step at a
time to an established religion and to all the persecution and intolerance that such establishments typically entailed. Although the clause
may be partly rooted in a concern for the disrespect communicated to
nonadherents of a favored religion, the evils at which it took aim in
order to avoid movement toward the ultimate evil of an established
religion were considerably broader than that. As the Supreme Court
succinctly and, I believe, accurately described them, these evils primarily include "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity." 29 In keeping with this understanding of the clause's roots, the intensity of judicial review under
the clause should vary not according to the degree of disrespect communicated by the law under review, but instead according to the extent to which the law implicates any of the three evils identified by the
30

Court.

27

See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment

of religion") (emphasis added); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
28 See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Edmond Cahn, The 'Establishment of Religion- Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1274 (1961); Van Alstyne, supra note 12.
29
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). See also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612
(quoting Walz).
30 See Simson, supra note 8, at 911, 915-16.

